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Authentication and consensus overhead in vehicular
ad hoc networks
Jonathan Petit · Zoubir Mammeri
Abstract Vehicular ad hoc networks aim at increasing pas-
senger safety by exchanging warning messages between ve-
hicles wirelessly. A main challenge is to resist to various
malicious abuses and security attacks. However, any secu-
rity mechanism comes with overhead. We analyze how the
authentication algorithm ECDSA and the consensus mech-
anism impact the vehicular network performance and the
braking distance. Processing and communication overheads,
decision methods for consensus, are analyzed by analytical
models and intensive simulations. We propose a formula to
assess the total time overhead of the authentication. Results
conclude that the authentication key size should be chosen
carefully, and the decision method should be adapted to the
context.
Keywords Authentication overhead · Vehicular networks ·
ECDSA · Consensus
1 Introduction
In 2007, road accidents have cost 110 deaths, 4600 injuries
and €438 millions daily in the European Union [1]. The
damage is similarly devastating in the United States with
102 deaths, 7900 injuries and $630 millions daily [2, 3].
Therefore, industry consortia, governments, and automotive
companies, have made the reduction of vehicular fatalities
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a top priority [4]. To raise this challenge, a main idea is to
make vehicles and roads smarter thanks to wireless com-
munications. Indeed, wireless communications will increase
the line-of-sight of the driver and make vehicles aware of
their environment. Modern vehicles now include a set of
processors connected to a central computing platform that
provides many wired and wireless interfaces. Smart vehi-
cles are those vehicles that are equipped with On-Board
Unit (OBU), which has recording, processing, positioning,
and location capabilities and that supports wireless secu-
rity protocols. Roads can be made smart with Road-Side
Units (RSU), installed along a road, that can inform pass-
ing vehicles about the road traffic conditions. A wireless ve-
hicular network is composed by OBU and RSU, connected
wirelessly. The VSC Project [5] details the 75 applications
that could be deployed on vehicular networks. Applications
are divided in three categories: safety-related, traffic opti-
mization and infotainment. Automotive safety-related ap-
plications aim to assist drivers in avoiding vehicular acci-
dents, by providing advisories and early warnings to drivers,
using broadcast vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications.
Vehicles typically communicate as per the Dedicated Short
Range Communication standard (DSRC) [6], and broadcast
messages in response to certain notified events (emergency
message) or periodically (beacon message) [7]. In this pa-
per, we focus on V2V communications in Local Danger
Warning (LDW) application, which is considered one of the
most promising active safety applications for inter-vehicle
communication [8]. Since drivers of vehicles participating
in V2V communications are expected to act on messages
received from other participants, it is clearly necessary that
these messages be transmitted in a secure fashion. Unfortu-
nately, security mechanisms come with overhead that impact
the performance of the V2V communications, and hence
that of the safety applications. The IEEE 1609.2 standard
for vehicular ad hoc networks is based on the ECDSA al-
gorithm for supporting the authentication mechanism. The
main goal of this work is to define a formula, which assesses
the authentication overhead in VANET. We also introduce
the problem of consensus, which is an additional mechanism
that impacts the total time overhead of ECDSA.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we survey pre-
vious works. The authentication mechanism ECDSA is dis-
cussed in Sect. 3. Then, we investigate the processing and
communication overhead of ECDSA in Sects. 4 and 5. In
Sect. 6, we define the global authentication overhead of
ECDSA. Section 7 introduces the problem of consensus and
analyzes decision methods. Extensive simulations are done
to evaluate the impact of ECDSA on the braking distance.
A discussion highlights limits of our work and proposes op-
timizations in Sect. 8. Section 9 concludes the paper.
2 Related work
In [9], Iyer et al. provided an evaluation of the computational
overhead in V2V communications. They observed that the
performance bottlenecks could shift from security layer to
MAC layer, depending on the system parameters. They pro-
vided interesting values like buffer size at MAC layer. But
their work is independent of security protocols and compu-
tational capabilities. It does not give results about ECDSA
overhead. Moreover, they did not analyze the communica-
tion overhead.
Haas et al. [10] performed simulation using real vehicle
mobility from I-80 in Emeryville, California, United States.
They compared ECDSA (with P-224) and TESLA, analyz-
ing the communication range and the MAC layer delay.
Moreover, they provided an assessment of verification la-
tency for various hardware configurations. Their simulation
results show that TESLA performs poorer than ECDSA but
has a lower latency because of the smaller packet size.
In [11], Rao evaluated the performance of certification
mechanisms in vehicular networks. He analyzed the certifi-
cate distribution and revocation using Certificate Revocation
Lists (CRLs) and Freshness Checks. Moreover, the impact
of a queue at the security layer was investigated. Our work
complete this work by investigating the ECDSA overhead.
Our work differs from the above-mentioned studies.
First, we investigate the impact of the authentication key
size. Then we translate the overhead into an issue—namely
braking distance—of safety application like Local Danger
Warning.
Ostermaier et al. proposed the voting schemes to face
the problem of consensus in vehicular networks [8]. They
analyzed four decision methods to evaluate the plausibility
of received hazard messages. Their simulation results show
that the “majority of Freshest X with Threshold” is the best
efficient method to avoid false warning injection attack. Sec-
tion 7 completes this work by addressing the issue of setting
dynamically X and Threshold parameters.
3 Authentication in vehicular networks
In order to secure vehicular communications, Wireless Ac-
cess in Vehicular Environments (WAVE) architecture man-
dates the use of PKI mechanisms, where service appli-
cation messages are encrypted and vehicle safe-ty mes-
sages are digitally signed. All implementations of IEEE
1609.2 standard [12] shall support the Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [13] over the two NIST
curves P-224 and P-256. Moreover, all implementations of
this standard that support encryption shall support the Ellip-
tic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) over the
NIST curve P-256. ECDSA provides authentication with
digital signature utilizing the elliptic curve discrete loga-
rithm problem (ECDLP) as the underlying untraceable op-
eration.
3.1 ECDSA algorithm
ECDSA is a variant of the Digital Signature Algorithm
(DSA), which operates on elliptic curve groups. In [6, 14],
Neal Koblitz and Victor S. Miller introduced the use of el-
liptic curves in cryptography (ECC). ECC is an approach
to public-key cryptography based on the algebraic struc-
ture of elliptic curves over finite fields. To use ECC all par-
ties must agree on the elements defining the elliptic curve,
which are domain parameters of the scheme. Each partici-
pant does not usually achieve the generation of domain pa-
rameters since this involves counting the number of points
on a curve, which is time-consuming and troublesome to im-
plement. As a result, NIST and SECG published domain pa-
rameters of elliptic curves for several common field sizes
[7, 15]. Johnson signature scheme [16] is an algorithm to
compute ECDSA, and includes three phases: key genera-
tion, signature generation and signature verification. These
phases are described in Algorithm 1.
3.2 Complexity of ECDSA
In this section, we investigate the time complexity of scalar
multiplication, modular multiplication and inversion, to
evaluate the ECDSA processing time and complexity.
3.2.1 Scalar multiplication
In ECDSA, a scalar multiplication [17] of a given random
point is used in signature generation and verification. This
Algorithm 1 ECDSA
a. Key generation
1. Obtain a set of elliptic curve domain parameters
q denotes the size of the underlying field Fq , which can be a large
prime or a prime to a power
a, b ∈ Fq : parameters of elliptic curve E
G ∈E: point on E
n: order of G (n prime greater than 2160)
h= ord(E)/ord(G), where ord(X) denotes the order of X
2. Select a random number d ∈ [1, n− 1] as private key
3. Compute the public key Q= dG
(E,Q,G,n) are public.
b. Signature generation
input: message m and (d,Q)
1. Select a random number k ∈ [1, n− 1]
2. Compute kG= (x1, y1) and r = x−1 mod n. If r = 0 goto 1
3. Compute s = k−1(e+ dr) mod n with e=H(m). If s = 0 goto 1
4. The signature of m is (r, s).
c. Signature verification
input: (r, s),m,Q
1. Verify r, s ∈ [1, n− 1]
2. Compute w = s−1 mod n
3. Compute u1 = ew mod n and u2 = rw mod n with e=H(m)
4. Compute X1 = u1G+ u2Q and V =X1 mod n
5. If V = r then signature accepted.
operation is the most time-consuming part of the total signa-
ture computation [18]. Specifically, given a n-bit long scalar
k and a point P on the curve, we have to compute the elliptic
curve scalar multiplication kP . There are two possible algo-
rithms to calculate kP ; the Add-and-Double algorithm and
the Montgomery algorithm. These algorithms require sev-
eral field multiplications, additions, and potentially one in-
version of the point coordinates. Authors in [19] showed the
advantage of the cryptographic usage of Montgomery-form
elliptic curves in constrained environments such as mobile
devices. Hence, the efficiency of ECDSA relies deeply on
the arithmetic of the curve and the arithmetic of the under-
lying field [18].
3.2.2 Modular multiplication
Modular multiplication is typically the most critical opera-
tion in the computation of elliptic curves scalar multiplica-
tion. Given a word length of n bits, an n-bit integer m called
the modulus, and two n-bit operands x and y, the problem is
the computation of xy mod m. Montgomery’s algorithm for
modular multiplication [20] is considered as the fastest al-
gorithm when x, y, and m are large [19]. The idea of Mont-
gomery is to reduce the length of the intermediate results to
a fixed quantity of n+ 1 bits. This is achieved by interleav-
ing the computations and additions of new partial products
with divisions by 2, each of them reducing the bit-length of
the intermediate result by one. Algorithm 2 is used to deter-
Algorithm 2 Montgomery multiplication
Require: m= (mn−1 . . . m1 m0)b , x = (xn−1 . . . x1 x0)b ,
y = (yn−1 . . . y1 y0)b , with 0≤ x, y < m,
R = bn with gcd(m,b)= 1 and m′ =−m−1 mod b
A← 0 (Notation: A= (an−1 . . . a1 a0)b)
for i to (n− 1) do
ui ← (a0 + xiy0)m′ mod b
A← (A+ xiy + uim)/b
end for
if A≥m then
A←A−m
end if
return A // A= xyR−1 mod m
mine a modular multiplication (n is the bit-length of x, y,
or m, and b the radix) [21]. If operations (modular addition,
modular multiplication, multiplication, addition, shift) on A
are considered done in constant time, the time complexity is
O(n) and the space complexity is O(n) [22, 23].
3.2.3 Modular inversion
The modular inversion is another time consuming opera-
tion in scalar multiplication. The Montgomery inversion is
a way to compute x−1 mod m. The Montgomery inversion
is based on Montgomery multiplication algorithm. Mont-
gomery inverse of an integer x ∈ [1,m − 1] is j = x−1bn
such that where m is prime and n= log2m is the bit-length.
The time complexity of the Montgomery modular inversion
is O(n) [24].
3.2.4 Time complexity
We define addition, doubling, scalar multiplication, mod-
ular multiplication, modular inversion and squaring opera-
tions in elliptic curve groups as functions P +Q, 2P , kP ,
MUL, INV , SQR. Hash function is denoted by HASH. TX
is the time needed to compute the operation X. In [25],
authors proposed algorithms to compute P + Q and 2P .
Table 1 summarizes time of elliptic curve point operations
TP+Q, T2P , TkP, with n the bit-length of multiplication
operands.
ECDSA signature generation and verification are fully
performed by modular multiplications, squaring, modu-
lar inverse and hash functions. So the time complexity of
ECDSA is given in function of TMUL, TSQR, TINV and THASH .
Signature generation time is:
Tsign = 2TMUL + TINV + TkP + THASH
= (6n+ 2)TMUL + TINV + 5nTSQR + THASH (1)
Table 1 Operation times
Operation Operation time
P +Q TP+Q = TSQR + 4× TMUL
2P T2P = 4× TSQR + 2× TMUL
kP TkP = n× (TP+Q + T2P )
Signature verification time is:
Tverify = 2TMUL + TINV + 2TkP + THASH
= (12n+ 2)TMUL + TINV + 10nTSQR + THASH (2)
THASH is member of (1) and (2). Hence, we analyze HASH
time complexity. DSRC standard supports the use of SHA-
224 and SHA-256 as hash functions. The SHA-256 algo-
rithm is defined in the FIPS180-2 standard [26]. The time
complexity of SHA-256 is O(M × n) where M is the size
of the message to hash. Compared to the scalar multipli-
cation, the modulus addition and subtraction operation cost
is negligible and thus omitted. So, ECDSA could be di-
vided into modular multiplication, modular inversion and
hash function. As Montgomery’s multiplication complex-
ity is O(n), Montgomery’s modular inverse complexity is
O(n), and hash function complexity is O(M × n). Then,
the total time complexity of ECDSA is O(n)+O(M × n).
4 Processing overhead of ECDSA
In [27], the generic time overhead of a message M is given
as follows:
Tov(M)= Tsign(M)+ Ttx(SignPrKV [M])+ Tverify(M) (3)
with:
• Tsign(M): time to sign M.
• Tverify(M) : time to verifyM.
• SignPrKV [M]: signature of M by the sender V and in-
cludes the Certificate Authority’s certificate of the signing
key.
• Ttx(SignPrKV [M]): time to transmit the signature.
In this section, we investigate the processing overhead
of ECDSA. So, we are just interested in Tsign(M) and
Tverify(M). These times correspond to the process done by
each vehicle for transmission and reception of a signed mes-
sage. The processing overhead is also known as the compu-
tational overhead. This overhead arises because the security-
related operations such as signing and verifying, require a fi-
nite amount of time for completion at the processor of each
vehicle. The computational overhead includes:
(i) Certificate Selection: Before signing a message a cer-
tificate needs to be selected from a pool of valid certifi-
cates for ensuring anonymity [27].
(ii) Signing Message: On receiving a message to be se-
cured, the hash of the message is computed and signed
(encrypted) using the private key associated with the
certificate selected. Then, this signature and the certifi-
cate are sent (with the message) to the lower layers for
transmission. In the case of ECDSA, the signature has
two components, r and s.
(iii) Verifying Certificate: On receiving a message, the cer-
tificate is considered valid if it is not included in the
CRLs present in the OBU in case of the CRL based
schemes, or the certificate is considered fresh in case
of the Freshness Check Scheme [11].
(iv) Verifying Message: In the case of ECDSA, the hash of
the message is computed and used with the signature
component s to obtain r . This value of r is compared
with the one present in the signature.
The certification mechanisms are out of the scope of this
paper and are investigated in [11]. In this paper, we focus on
(ii) and (iv) overheads.
4.1 Experimentation model
There are three main cryptographic libraries: MIRACL,
OpenSSL and Crypto++. Authors in [28] proposed a com-
parison and concluded that MIRACL has the best perfor-
mance for operations on elliptic curves over binary fields.
So, ECDSA was implemented using MIRACL and follow-
ing the Algorithm 1. The benchmark was launched 500
times to smooth the interferences of the system due to the
interrupts. All experimentations were done on an Intel Pen-
tium D 3.4 GHz workstation with 1 Go RAM on a Mandriva
2008 Operating System. Table 2 shows operation times. Ta-
ble 3 shows the execution times of signature generation
and verification for ECDSA (using NIST curves P-224 and
P-256).
4.2 Experimentation results
4.2.1 Processing delay
Vehicles have to generate a signature for each message sent
and verify signature for each message received. The time
required for these operations is called processing delay.
ECDSA with a P-224 curve (respectively P-256) fits with
an authentication key size of 224 bits (respectively 256). In
Table 2, TkP is almost equal to signature generation time.
It confirms that scalar multiplication is the most expensive
operation of ECDSA. Reporting values of Table 2 in for-
mulas (1) and (2), confirms Table 3. Table 3, which gives
Tsign and Tverify, shows that using P-256 instead of P-224 in
Table 2 Operation times on a Pentium D 3.4 GHz workstation
Key size
(bit)
TMUL (µs) TINV (µs) TkP (µs) THASH (µs)
224 1.23 18.91 2468.71 8.47
256 1.39 22.01 3297.23 10.09
Table 3 Signature generation and verification times on a Pentium D
3.4 GHz workstation
Key size (bit) Signature generation
(ms)
Signature verification
(ms)
224 2.50 4.97
256 3.33 6.63
the signature generation adds a time overhead of 33.2%. Us-
ing P-256 instead of P-224 in the signature verification adds
a time overhead of 33.4%. Theoretical analysis of ECDSA
shows a linear-time complexity depending on the key size.
In Table 3, the processing delay increases when key size in-
creases. These experimentation results validate the analyti-
cal model.
4.2.2 Distance
As we focus on the vehicular networks, we should not forget
that vehicles are moving. During the generation and/or veri-
fication phase, a vehicle V covers a distance DV (in meters)
depending on its velocity vV (in km/h). T (in milliseconds)
is Tsign, Tverify or Tsign + Tverify.
DV =
1
3600
× vV × T (4)
The expected number of vehicles equipped with the DSRC
system, which are in transmission range R (in km), is de-
fined in [29] by NTX .
NTX = 2NLγρR (5)
The product γρ is the density of equipped vehicles (in
veh/km/lane), NL the number of lanes. We consider the
following scenario. In a highway with 6 lanes (3 in each
direction) of 3 m each, we assume a uniform presence
of vehicles, with an inter-vehicle space restricted by the
safe driving distance DS = 0.56 × vV (in meters). Vehi-
cles are mobile (vV = 130 km/h) and transmit WSMs ev-
ery 300 ms over a 300 m communication range. We con-
sider a vehicle V located on a highway; V can hear NTX =
2×6×1× 100073 ×0.3≈ 49 vehicles. V will receive 49 mes-
sages per 300 ms with a market penetration γ = 1 (100%
of vehicle equipped with a DSRC-capable device). Before
V can send a new message, it should be able to process
Fig. 1 Packet size overhead
all incoming messages within 300 ms. One signature veri-
fication should be faster than the maximum tolerable pro-
cessing delay per message DPMAX . Assuming V receives
all the 49 messages, DPMAX is 300/49 = 6.12 ms. DPMAX
is greater than the average signature verification time for
P-224. But the condition is not verified for a key size of
256 bits. So, the authentication key size should be cho-
sen within the application constraints. According to (4),
the vehicle will cover DV = 13600 × 130× 6.63 = 0.239 m
during one ECDSA signature verification. Assuming that
49 messages are received at the same time, V will travel
49×DV ≈ 11.711 m. The braking distance for V is defined
as DB =
( 518 vV )
2
2a (in meters). In normal environment, on a
dry road with a deceleration rate a = 6.8 m/s2 and a velocity
of 130 km/h, V stops inDB = 96 m. But since V has to ver-
ify the messages, it will stop in 96+ 11.711 = 107.711 m,
corresponding at an increase of 12.2% of the braking dis-
tance. Moreover, if the vehicle does not make decisions
(brake, lane change) without the driver agreement, we have
to add the driver’s reaction time DR of 1.5 seconds. In spite
of technologic advances in pneumatic and automotive in-
crease driver’s safety by offsetting the non-respect of DS ,
the deployment of ECDSA may jeopardize these ameliora-
tions.
5 Communication overhead of ECDSA
As we see in (3), the total time overhead of ECDSA depends
on Tsign(M), Tverify(M), and Ttx(SignPrKV [M]). The over-
head is divided into two parts: the processing overhead and
the communication overhead. After analyzing the computa-
tional overhead in the previous section, we now investigate
the communication overhead Ttx(SignPrKV [M]). The com-
munication overhead is also known as bandwidth overhead.
The bandwidth overhead arises due to the headers and foot-
ers associated with the security mechanism resulting in extra
over-the-air bytes. The bandwidth overhead includes:
(i) Increased Message Size: As shown in Fig. 1, the packet
transmitted over the air contains the message to be ex-
changed along with the certificate used to sign the mes-
sage and the signature.
(ii) Dissemination of Revocation Information: In the CRL
based schemes, the CRLs need to be disseminated from
the infrastructure to each vehicle in the network that
can potentially receive messages signed using the cer-
tificates present in the CRLs. In the case of Freshness
Check scheme, the nodes have to periodically perform
Freshness Check operations to ensure that their certifi-
cates are fresh.
The certification mechanisms are out of the scope of this pa-
per. We do not analyze (ii) and focus on the (i) overhead. We
also investigate the impact of the communication overhead
on the transfer delay and the braking distance.
5.1 Packet overhead
The Wave Short Message format (WSM) is used for safety
messages like local danger warning or periodic information
message. Figure 2 describes the WSM format. Figure 3 de-
scribes the certificate format.
A WSM is first signed with ECDSA, and sent using the
WAVE Short Message Protocol (WSMP). When a WSM
is signed, authentication protocol adds a signed certifi-
cate (signer) and a signature to the original message (un-
signed_wsm). As we see in Fig. 2, the unsigned WSM pay-
load is 53 bytes long. The WSM header is 19 bytes long.
First, when Alice signs a message with her private key, noth-
ing guarantees that Alice can be trusted. Certificate proves
this trustworthiness. A certificate of size Scert (plus 1 byte
for the certificate type) and a signature of size Ssign are ap-
pended. Figure 3 gives the OBU signing certificate format.
We observe that the length of a certificate depends on two
parameters:
• Spu (in bits): the point size of the elliptic curveG depend-
ing on the public key algorithm associated with the key.
• Ssigcert (in bits): the size of the signature used to sign the
certificate.
The length of a certificate Scert (in bytes) is defined by:
Scert =
Spu
8
+ 1+
Ssigcert
8
× 2=
Spu
8
+ 1+
Ssigcert
4
(6)
Secondly, to provide the authentication service, the message
is signed and the signature is attached to the message. The
length of a signature Ssign (in bytes), attached to a mes-
sage, depends on the elliptic curve Ssigmess (in bits) used in
ECDSA.
Ssign =
Ssigmess
8
× 2=
Ssigmess
4
(7)
Finally, when ECDSA is used, it adds a certificate and a sig-
nature in each sent message, which results in an overhead
Sov (in bytes) given by the sum of (6) and (7) in formula (8):
Sov = Scert + Ssign =
Spu
8
+ 1+
Ssigcert
4
+
Ssigmess
4
(8)
Fig. 2 WAVE safety message format [30]
Fig. 3 OBU signing certificate format [30]
The total length of a WSM (in bytes) is defined in (9):
SWSM =
Ssigmess
8
× 2+
Ssigcert
8
× 2+
Spu
8
+ 1
+ 32+ 20+ 53
=
Ssigmess
4
+
Ssigcert
4
+
Spu
8
+ 106
= Sov + 105 (9)
where 32 bytes is the header length in the certificate.
5.2 Communication delay
The communication delay is defined as the time elapsed be-
tween the generation of a packet and its successful reception
at the application layer. It includes the queuing delay and the
medium service time (due to backoff, transmission delay,
and propagation delay, etc.). Many delay analysis models
for IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol have been proposed. To our
knowledge, model from [31] is the best suited for VANET
environment where there is no acknowledgement, and MAC
layer retransmissions. In [31], the mean beacon transmission
delay is defined as:
Ttx =
W−1
2
[σPe + TSPS + TCPC] + (1− pi)n−1(1− e)TS
+ (1− (1− pi)n−1(1− e))TC (10)
where W is the contention window, σ is the slot time, Pe ,
PS , PC are the probabilities of empty channel, successful
transmission and collision respectively. TS and TC are the
duration of successful transmission and collision respec-
tively. These values depend on the packet size. pi is the trans-
mission probability in a slot by an active station, n is the total
number of vehicles, e is the probability of a beacon packet
corruption by noise, and Th is the duration of both Preamble
and PLCP header. From (10), we conclude that the commu-
nication delay depends on the packet size and the network
density. Finally, the transmission delay is given by:
Ttx =
W − 1
2
[
σPe +
(
Th +
Sov × 8
DR
+DIFS+ δ
)
PS
+
(
Th +
Sov × 8
DR
+ EIFS+ δ
)
PC
]
+ (1− pi)n−1(1− e)
(
Th +
Sov × 8
DR
+DIFS+ δ
)
+
(
1− (1− pi)n−1(1− e)
)
×
(
Th +
Sov × 8
DR
+ EIFS+ δ
)
(11)
5.3 Simulation model and assumptions
All DSRC parameters used in this paper are listed in Ta-
ble 4 and are IEEE 802.11p standard compliant. We conduct
simulations using ns-2.34 within a 95% confidence interval.
We make use of a Nakagami’s probabilistic radio propaga-
tion model, because recent research has shown that a fading
radio propagation model, such as the Nakagami’s model is
best suited for simulation of a WAVE environment [32, 33].
We use the ns-2 extensions provided by Chen et al. [34] as
physical and MAC layer.
We consider the following scenario. In a highway of 5 km
long, with 3 lanes in one direction, vehicles have a max ve-
locity vi where i is the lane number. Vehicle speeds are cho-
sen according to speed limitation on French highway and av-
erage speed on a three lanes highway. We assume a uniform
density β in veh/km/lane. Each node sends WSM of size SA
Table 4 Simulation parameters
Parameter Value
Propagation delay δ (µs) 1
Time slot σ (µs) 13
Packet size SA (bytes) 73, 198, 256, 262
Vehicle density β (veh/km/lane) [1; 45]
DIFS (µs) 64
EIFS (µs) 248
Packet interarrival time λ (s) 0.1
CWMin 15
Data rate DR (Mbps) 6
Link Layer queue size (packets) 50
Vehicle speed (m/s) v1 = 27.7
v2 = 30.5
v3 = 36.1
Radio range R (meters) 300
Fig. 4 Highway scenario
where A is the authentication chosen (WSM payload, WSM
and certificate, WSM and certificate and P-224, WSM and
certificate and P-256). According to safety-related applica-
tions requirements [5], each node generates one packet every
100 ms, and has a transmission range of 300 m for message
exchange.We increase the density from 1 to 45 veh/km/lane,
which means from free-flow to jam scenario. In our simula-
tions, vehicles should enter the system in such a way that the
network density remains stable. But in ns-2, all nodes are
generated at the beginning of the simulation. Consequently,
if the simulation has 600 nodes, then at t = 0 there are 600
nodes at the same place. As in standard ns-2, nodes could not
be in sleep mode, they will participate to the network traffic
even if they do not exist in reality. To avoid this undesirable
effect, we monitor the traffic in an area y = [2000;3000],
denoted by the box in Fig. 4.
5.4 Simulation results
There are six impacting parameters in a DSRC scenario:
packet size, data rate, vehicle density, transmission power,
message frequency and the number of lanes. The commu-
nication delay depends on the message size, the arrival rate
at the MAC layer queuing system, the number of vehicles
Fig. 5 Communication overhead: effect of density on delay and brak-
ing distance for different packet size
within radio range, the probability of collision and the prob-
ability that the channel is busy. It is well established that
larger the message size is, larger the probability of collision
is. We focus on the effect of vehicle density because it af-
fects the number of vehicles within radio range and the ar-
rival rate at the MAC layer, and it increases the probability
of collision or channel availability.
Figure 5 shows the impact of density on communica-
tion delay for one packet transmission. When the den-
sity increases, more vehicles are within the radio range.
They compete for channel access, thus increasing the prob-
ability of collision. We simulated the same scenario with
different packet size. WSM payload represents the WSM
without security, i.e. 73 bytes. WSM + certificate repre-
sents the WSM appended with a signed certificate, i.e. 198
bytes. P-224 (respectively P-256) represents WSM + cer-
tificate signed with ECDSA and P-224 curve (resp. P-256
curve), i.e. 254 bytes (resp. 262 bytes). Figure 5 shows
that without security, the density has a lower impact on
the communication delay than in the other cases. Accord-
ing to the small size of WSM in this case, this result is
obvious. Adding a security mechanism doubles the com-
munication delay for density lower than 30 veh/km/lane.
In high-density conditions, communication delay is multi-
plied by three. If we focus on the authentication key size,
the comparison between P-224 and P-256 shows an over-
head from 3% to 8%. The scale on the right of Fig. 5
shows the impact of density on braking distance. We no-
tice that adding a security mechanism increases the brak-
ing distance from 2 cm to 10 cm for one packet. It may
seem to be negligible but it is for one packet. So, if we
are in the same scenario as in Sect. 4.2.2, a vehicle will
have to check every signed messages received. The number
Fig. 6 Communication overhead: effect of density on delay and brak-
ing distance for n packets
of messages received depends on its neighborhood density.
Figure 6 shows that the communication overhead adds until
10 meters to the normal braking distance (named “without
security”). The worst case is when a vehicle needs to ver-
ify one packet per neighbor before making a decision. This
case introduces the consensus problem which is detailed in
Sect. 7.
6 Total time overhead of ECDSA
6.1 Definition
In Sects. 4 and 5, we investigate the processing overhead
and the communication overhead. We merge both overheads
to define the total time overhead of ECDSA according to
formula (3).
Tov(M) = Tsign(M)+ Ttx(SignPrKV [M])+ Tverify(M)
= (6n+ 2)TMUL + TINV + 5nTSQR + THASH
+
W−1
2
[
σPe +
(
Th +
Sov × 8
DR
+DIFS+ δ
)
PS
+
(
Th +
Spu + 2× (Ssigcert + Ssigmess)+ 8
DR
+ EIFS+ δ
)
PC
]
+ (1− pi)n−1(1− e)
×
(
Th +
Spu + 2× (Ssigcert + Ssigmess)+ 8
DR
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Fig. 8 Comparison between
processing and communication
overhead
+DIFS+ δ
)
+
(
1− (1− pi)n−1(1− e)
)
×
(
Th +
Spu + 2× (Ssigcert + Ssigmess)+ 8
DR
+ EIFS+ δ
)
+ (12n+ 2)TMUL + TINV
+ 10nTSQR + THASH (12)
The formula (12) highlights that the total time overhead of
ECDSA depends on the architecture of the OBU (utiliza-
tion of crypto-processor or not), the authentication key size
(P-224 or P-256), and the neighborhood density.
6.2 Impact on delay and braking distance
Figure 7 shows the processing and communication over-
head of ECDSA. We observe that the processing mecha-
nism adds 0.3 m to the braking distance for P-224 and 0.4 m
for P-256. For one packet transmission, the processing over-
head is greater than the communication overhead. Figure 8
confirms this result by highlighting the ratio of processing
overhead into the total overhead. For one packet verification,
more than 80% of ECDSA overhead is due to the processing
mechanism.
As shown in Fig. 9, the processing delay, for n messages,
is higher than the communication delay. For a density of
35 veh/km/lane, the communication delay is about 100 ms,
while processing delay is 400 ms. Moreover, Fig. 9 details
the difference between P-224 and P-256 delay. Using P-256
instead of P-224 has a greater impact on processing delay
than on communication delay. Indeed, the communication
curves are slightly different, while there is a gap between
the two processing curves. Likewise, for a density of 35
veh/km/lane, communication adds 5 m to the braking dis-
tance, while the processing adds more than 17 m. One more
time, using P-256 instead of P-224 has a greater impact on
Fig. 9 Time overhead: effect of
density on delay and braking
distance for n packets
Fig. 10 Total time overhead:
effect of density on delay and
braking distance for n packets
the processing. Indeed, there is a gap of more than 5 m,
which is greater than the average length of a car.
Figure 10 shows the total ECDSA overhead for one vehi-
cle, which has to wait and check for n messages, depending
on the density. In this figure, processing and communication
delay are merged, and shows that the total overhead intro-
duced by ECDSA is greater than 1 second for P-256 and
800 milliseconds for P-224 in high-density situations. The
comparison between P-256 and P-224 shows an overhead of
30%. Moreover, in high-density scenarios, the braking dis-
tance is increased by more than 20 m. If P-256 is used, it
adds an overhead from 1% to 8% higher than P-224. We
conclude that the authentication has a significant impact on
the delay and the braking distance. This security mechanism
could have a high impact on the behavior of the application.
Consequently, the authentication key size should be chosen
carefully.
7 Consensus mechanism
7.1 Definition
Many applications depend on WAVE Short Message recep-
tion. For example, LDW application warns the driver in
function of information included into the WSM. As pointed
out before, security plays an important role in safety-related
applications and V2V communications. For example, con-
ventional solutions focus on securing the communications
by utilizing digital signatures. But, since the detection of
hazards is based on local sensor readings, an attacker may
bilk the detection process of his vehicle. In this way, manip-
ulating sensor readings to simulate a fake message may still
result in a perfectly signed and certified message. Therefore,
we evaluate the plausibility of information received during
the decision process by a consensus mechanism. Thus, to
avoid false information, application waits for x WSMs be-
fore warning the driver. This mechanism is called consen-
sus [35]. The selection of x is an open issue. Four decision
methods have been proposed in [8]. Our work is based on
the decision method “majority of Freshest X with Thresh-
old”. According to [8], an important issue is the determi-
nation of the two parameters X and Threshold. This has to
be based on the current traffic situation, which therefore has
to be analyzed automatically by the LDW application. To
set the parameter X, we propose and analyze four decision
methods.
7.2 Decision methods
To support the decision process, we analyze four decision
methods, which estimate the plausibility of a received warn-
ing by performing voting schemes. We detail how to set the
consensus parameter x, which is the number of messages
needed before making a decision.
We define two contrasting techniques:
• Static: x value never changed whatever the neighborhood
density is.
• Dynamic: x is set in function of the current neighborhood
density. As x is computed frequently, we denote it x(t),
where t is the current time of computation.
Moreover we define three dynamic methods. The dynamic
naive, the dynamic naive ahead, and majority ahead.
(i) Dynamic naive: x(t) is the number of one-hop neigh-
bors at time t .
(ii) Dynamic naive ahead: x(t) is the number of one-hop
neighbors at time t ahead of the current vehicle.
(iii) Majority ahead: x(t) is the half of the number of one-
hop neighbors plus one at time t ahead of the current
vehicle.
Dynamic decision methods compute the number of one-hop
neighbors owing to WSMs received periodically.
Figure 11 shows the state transition diagram of a vehicle.
A vehicle goes from idle to sending alert when it detects a
hazard. The target of the hazard could be itself (the vehi-
cle stops because of an emergency reason), another vehicle
or the environment (ice, hole, obstacle). While the hazard is
Fig. 11 State transition diagram of a vehicle
still detected, the vehicle will generate an alert. A vehicle
goes from idle to receiving alert when it receives an alert.
It keeps collecting WSMs until it reaches the threshold (i.e.
the consensus parameter “enough”). It goes from receiving
alert to idlewhen the hazard location is overpassed, or when
the hazard has disappeared. The vehicle goes from receiv-
ing alert to decision when it receives enough WSMs (i.e.
consensus parameter). Another case of transition could be
the maximum delay allowed before making a decision. In-
deed, safety-related applications have real-time constraints,
and mandate to react before a specified delay (TMAX). TMAX
is less than 500 ms for highly time-critical applications, and
equal to three seconds for time-relevant applications [36]. In
Fig. 11, T is the time between the first reception and the cur-
rent time. In some cases, with the precautionary principle,
a vehicle should make a decision even if it does not receive
enough WSMs for this hazard.
7.3 Simulation model and assumptions
We assume that a certain fraction of the simulated vehicles
will misbehave, which may result in fake attack. The goal of
the fake attack is to trigger a false decision of the LDW ap-
plication at the attacked vehicles. We define two simulation
models.
(i) Non-collaborative: There is no collusion between at-
tackers. Each attacker will generate its fake warning and
broadcasts it. It will not help other attackers. Without
collaboration, we assume that the probability of having
multiple attackers reporting the same hazard is too low
to consider this case.
Fig. 12 Impact of consensus
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(ii) Collaborative: The attackers collude to make the fake
warning faster accepted. In other words, when an at-
tacker receives a fake warning, it will generate a fake
warning concerning the sender.
We assume that a node cannot possess multiple identities,
and has a majority of honest one-hop neighbors. We do not
consider a forwarding mechanism (i.e., a vehicle generates
a warning only when it detects a hazard). The results pre-
sented are from a scenario with 10% of attackers and 10%
of honest vehicles will generate a warning. We set x = 2
for the static method because in simulation context (i), two
messages are enough to avoid fake attacks. For the dynamic
methods, we define x = min(xMAX,DYN). DYN is the re-
sult of the dynamic method (cf. Sect. 7.2), and xMAX is the
maximum number of messages needed depending on TMAX
value.
7.4 Simulation results
Figure 12 shows the decision delay for the four decision
methods analyzed. The decision delay is the time between
the reception of the first warning and the decision. As P-224
and P-256 shares the same performance, we only present
P-224 results. The static,majority ahead, and dynamic naive
all methods show a percentage of false decision equal to
zero. This could be explained because to reach a false deci-
sion, a vehicle needs to receive twice the fake warning from
two different vehicles. But, in the current scenario (i.e. sce-
nario (i)), there is no collaboration between attackers. So, a
vehicle will always receive only one fake warning. That is
the reason why the static method is the best in this context.
Only two warnings will be enough to avoid fake attack. In
the context of simulation (ii) (with collaboration and honest
majority), the best method is the mean. Indeed, in a context
of honest majority, n(t)2 is enough to avoid fake attack (n(t)
is the current number of neighbors at time t).
Figure 12 shows that static, majority ahead, and dynamic
naive ahead respect the maximum delay TMAX (3 seconds
here). Moreover, the mean method has the lowest deci-
sion delay because of the lowest consensus parameter (i.e.
x = 2). On the scale on the right of the figure, we remark
that the static and mean methods have the lowest overhead
of the braking distance. Indeed, the maximum overhead is
20 meters. Moreover, the braking distance overhead is sta-
ble when the density increases. From 15 veh/km/lane, the
two other methods doubles the braking distance. This un-
derlines the need of a forwarding mechanism to increase the
dissemination area. Thus, this overhead will be less critical.
We also notice that from 15 veh/km/lane the overhead is sta-
ble. That is due to the threshold set to TMAX .
Figure 13 shows the impact of consensus and ECDSA on
the braking distance. We add Tov of (3) to the decision delay,
and translate it on braking distance. Once again, static, and
majority ahead have the lowest braking distance overhead
and it remains stable. Indeed, the braking distance overhead
is greater than 25 meters. In high-density scenarios, dynamic
naive and dynamic naive ahead methods multiply by 7 the
braking distance.
8 Discussion
In Sects. 4 and 5, we investigate the authentication overhead
of ECDSA. We conclude that the processing time overhead
is of paramount importance in the total time overhead of
Fig. 13 Impact of consensus and ECDSA on braking distance
ECDSA. To improve the computational overhead, a crypto-
processor dedicated to elliptic curve cryptography could be
interesting. Moreover, in [37], authors proposed to not at-
tach certificates to all messages, but rather for one every α
successive beacons; they also proposed certificate caching to
reduce verification processing overhead and the packet size
overhead. In [38], authors proposed to dynamically change
the transmission power depending on the vehicle density to
reduce the NTX .
Section 7 introduces the problem of consensus. It shows
that the consensus avoids fake attacks. We notice that the
context influences the decision method used in the consen-
sus mechanism. We suggest a technique to switch between
methods in function of the current context.
9 Conclusion and future work
VANETs deployment has the potential to greatly increase
vehicular safety and improve driving experience. But, ve-
hicular communications need to be secured. Therefore, the
DSRC standard for vehicular ad hoc networks is based on
the ECDSA algorithm for supporting authentication mecha-
nism. But, security mechanisms come with overheads that
affect the performance of the V2V communications, and
hence that of the safety applications. In this paper, we inves-
tigate the total overhead of ECDSA, combining the packet
size, processing and communication overheads. We focus
on safety applications, and analyze the impact of the au-
thentication on the braking distance. We conduct simulation
study in order to evaluate the performance of secured beacon
safety message dissemination in vehicular ad hoc networks.
We pay special attention to safety requirements while study-
ing networking performance issues.
Our results show that the processing overhead is higher
than the communication overhead. Depending on the appli-
cation requirements, the braking distance is increased by
more than an average length of a car in high-density sce-
nario. We highlight the impact of the authentication key size
in order to adapt security parameters to the application re-
quirements. Some optimizations were proposed.
To avoid false data dissemination, we introduce the prob-
lem of consensus. We analyze four decision methods to
check the data consistency. The static method shows the
best results in non-collaborative scenario. In collaborative
scenario, the dynamic method permits to change the number
of messages needed in function of density. Moreover, in the
context of a majority of honest vehicles, the mean method
shows the best results.
As of future work, we intend to enhance the authentica-
tion overhead assessment by adding the certificate distribu-
tion, verification and revocation mechanisms. Indeed, when
a node receives a WAVE short message, it has to check the
certificate appended to the message. The IEEE 1609 stan-
dards mandate the use of CRL, but do not specify how to
deal with. Moreover, we will complete our work on consen-
sus by adding an indicator to further improve the consensus
overhead and the performance of the decision process.
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